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RELATIONS OF EMPLOYERS WITH WORKERS'
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES
Dean J. Ralph Beaird*
I am very pleased to have the opportunity to participate with this
distinguished group in a discussion of a subject that is growing in
importance in the United States. I want to compliment Professor
Vogel-Polsky for providing the participants with a copy of Edward
Yemin's book, Workforce Reductions in Undertakings,' and an out-
line which will help us focus our discussion. My colleague, Mary Kay
Lynch, and I have agreed to share the topics in this outline. I will
provide a general overview and deal principally with relations of
employers with workers' representatives; she will deal specifically with
United States restrictions on management's right to dismiss workers
by means of plant closings or by workforce reductions, relations
between employers and public authorities, and collective bargaining.
In the process she will examine these problems from labor's point
of view. The statement by Professor Harold Oaklander on page 187
of the Yemin book that "[i]n the United States workers are not as
well protected against workforce reductions as in other industrial
countries" is probably more true today than it was in 1982. According
to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, an estimated 11.5 million employees
lost jobs through plant closings and layoffs between 1979 and 1984.2
At the present time, unlike the situation in many EEC countries,
no specific national legislation deals with plant closings or major
layoffs in the United States, although the House Education and Labor
Committee just reported out a bill, H.R. 1616. 3 This bill would require
employers to give ninety-days' notice to employees or their bargaining
representatives of a plant shutdown or mass layoff involving at least
fifty employees over a thirty-day period. The employer would be
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required to consult with the union during the ninety-day notice period
and to provide relevant information about the plant closing decision.
The Secretary of Labor then determines whether an employer has
complied in good faith with the notice requirements, grants waivers
of the notice requirement to employers if justified by "unavoidable
business circumstances," and exempts employers from disclosing sen-
sitive information. The ranking minority member of the committee
urged the committee to await the results of a study by a special plant
closing task force established by Labor Secretary Brock before pro-
posing legislative action.
As Ms. Lynch will report, there has not been a great deal of activity
in this area at the state level. One example of activity is in New
Jersey, where the state legislature passed a plant closing bill this
summer; however, the bill has not yet been signed by the governor.4
Such legislation appears to be threatened by employer organization
claims that this subject area is preempted by frderal law. Ms. Lynch
has some information from the industrial union department of the
AFL-CIO which she will distribute regarding the extent to which
collective bargaining agreements deal with this subject.
Statistics are not particularly good as to the extent to which col-
lective bargaining agreements require notice of mass layoffs and plant
closings. In his statement on H.R. 1616, Congressman Ford said that
at unionized firms, fewer than twenty percent of the major collective
bargaining agreements contain prenotification provisions.
In Western Europe, either through EEC directives or individual
country legislation, law plays a major and direct role in layoffs
resulting from plant closings. In the United States, however, the one
area in which the law comes into play in a major way on the issue
of plant closings and work transfers is in the application of the
bargaining requirements of the National Labor Relations Act. This
statute, which consists of the original 1935 Wagner Act, the 1947
Taft-Hartley Amendments, and the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Amend-
ments, applies to about fifty percent of the nation's private sector
work force.
The National Labor Relations Act places an obligation on both
covered employers and unions to bargain in good faith regarding
I S. 3024. The governor of New Jersey conditionally vetoed S. 3024 in August,
leaving only a provision for a state commission on plant closings; however, on
September 13 the Democratic caucus of the New Jersey Senate refused to forward
the bill as it existed after the conditional veto to the floor of the Senate. This action
effectively killed the bill.
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"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." The
nature of this obligation can be fully understood only by recognizing
some of the basic concepts underlying the bargaining process. The
principles of exclusive representation and majority rule have a per-
suasive influence on this process. To remedy the inequality of bar-
gaining power between employers and unorganized employees, Congress
not only guaranteed employees the right to organize, but also declared
that the representative chosen by a majority of the employees in an
appropriate bargaining unit is the exclusive representative for all unit
employees. The union chosen by the majority, therefore, represents
even those who vote for another union or for no union. This principle
of exclusivity, almost unique to the United States, is fundamental to
national labor policy and the collective bargaining process. One effect
of this principle is localized and fragmented bargaining.
Second, the basic thesis of the Act is to provide a legal framework
within which the parties try to reach private agreements regarding
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." It
was never intended that the government would become a party to
negotiation or directly or indirectly compel concessions or otherwise
sit in judgment upon the substantive terms of the agreement. It has
long been recognized that within this framework agreements in some
cases might be impossible.
Archibald Cox had this to say about the American system in his
collection of essays entitled Law and the National Labor Policy:
[tihe American system of industrial relations rests upon private
enterprise in markets which, despite increasing government regula-
tion, are still remarkably free. We believe in individual initiative,
private decision making, and personal responsibility not only as
economic and political doctrine but also as moral philosophy, al-
though our beliefs run beyond our practice in this respect as well
as others. Organized labor is scarely less committed to the existing
system than other segments of the community. It attracts more
idealists, reformers, and rebels, but most union officials, whether
business agents or general presidents, have the same basic beliefs
as their corporate counterparts. Specifically, they share the convic-
tion that wages and conditions of employment must be fixed by
private agreements.5
Third, and probably most important in terms of today's topic, the
Supreme Court in National Labor Relations Board v. Wooster Di-
A. Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY (1960).
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vision of Borg-Warner Corp.6 divided the subject of bargaining into
three segments: mandatory, permissive, and illegal. A bargaining
subject falling within the phrase "wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment" is considered a mandatory subject; all
other lawful subjects are termed permissive. Whether a subject is
mandatory has considerable significance. The parties are required to
bargain in good faith concerning mandatory subjects and the bona
fides of that bargaining can be second-guessed by the Board and the
courts. Also, a party may insist to impasse that a bargaining demand
concerning a mandatory subject be included in the collective agreement
and may resort to lawful economic weapons to achieve its demand.
Further, the employer is required to supply the union with all in-
formation relevant to mandatory subjects. Also, only with respect to
mandatory subjects does the Act forbid unilateral modification. Bar-
gaining is not, however, limited to mandatory subjects. Proposals
regarding permissive subjects may be advanced by either party and
may become enforceable upon agreement. But there is no statutory
duty to negotiate in good faith concerning these matters; a party is
free to bargain or not. A third segment consists of illegal subjects,
such as an unlawful union security or a hot cargo clause. The parties
may not lawfully bargain concerning these matters and, thus, any aggree-
ment reached is unenforceable. In the case of either permisive or illegal
subjects, the parties may neither insist to impasse nor engage in lawful
economic warfare because such conduct is in effect a refusal to bargain
over mandatory subjects. The net effect of this differentiation is to
employ administrative and judicial processes to draw a line between
subjects requiring bargaining and management functions. In effect,
the line is drawn between employee participation in decisionmaking
and management prerogatives. If the Board and the courts hold a
decision to close a plant or to transfer work for economic reasons
to be a mandatory subject, the employees may bargain over the
decision and receive relevant information incident to the employer's
plans. If such decisions are held to be permissive, then the employer
may act unilaterally without notice or consultation with the employee's
representative. While bargaining over the decision may not be re-
quired, bargaining over the effects of that decision on employees may
be.
Before 1962 the NLRB held that there was no statutory obligation
on the part of the employer to bargain over basic management
356 U.S. 342 (1958).
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decisions. The National Labor Relations Act was construed as not
covering managerial decisions motivated by the economics of business
operation. As a result, decisions to commit capital or managerial
effort to a new product line or to dispose of inefficient operations
were considered basic entrepreneurial rights that preceded the bar-
gaining duties imposed by the Act. Thus, although an employer could
be held to a duty to bargain on the effects of such decisions, he did
not have to bargain over the decision itself.
This position was perceived as having serious effects on job security,
and many unions argued that where an employer's decision had the
effect of terminating unit jobs, it involved "conditions of employ-
ment" requiring mandatory bargaining under the Act. In 1962 the
Kennedy Board accepted this construction in Fibreboard Paper Prod-
ucts Corp.7 In this case the Board extended the duty to bargain to
an economically motivated management decision to subcontract that
had the effect of eliminating bargaining unit jobs.
The Supreme Court upheld this position but added some significant
caveats:
[w]e are thus not expanding the scope of mandatory bargaining to
hold, as we do now, that the type of 'contracting out' involved in
this case - the replacement of employees in the existing bargaining
unit with those of an independent contractor to do the same work
under similar conditions of employment - is a statutory subject of
collective bargaining under § 8(d). Our decision need not and does
not encompass other forms of 'contracting out' or 'sub-contracting'
which arise daily in our complex economy.8
Justice Stewart, while concurring, wrote a further explanation. He
observed that there are many managerial decisions imperiling job
security that would not be the subject of collective bargaining. He
stated that "[d]ecisions concerning the commitment of investment
capital and the basic scope of the enterprise" are not subjects of
collective bargaining regardless of their impact on employment; such
decisions, Justice Stewart noted, lie at the "core of entrepreneurial
control." 9 This approach focuses on the nature of the decision and
asks whether it is one that is fundamental to the basic direction of
the enterprise.
138 NLRB 550 (1962), enf'd. 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
Id. at 223.
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The Kennedy-Johnson Board gave an expansive reading to the
majority holding in Fibreboard. Taking the position that any decision
having major effects on unit jobs should be a mandatory subject of
bargaining, the Board attempted to extend the bargaining obligation
to many areas such as partial closings, decisions to sell a business,
and changes in distribution systems. The Board's rationale was out-
lined succinctly in its decision in Ozark Trailer, Inc. '0 when it stated:
[ain employer's decision to make a major change in the nature
of his business, such as the termination of a portion thereof, is also
of significance for those employees whose jobs will be lost by the
termination. For, just as the employer has invested capital in the
business, so the employee has invested years of his work life, ac-
cumulating seniority, accruing pension rights, and developing the
skills that may or may not be salable to another employer. And,
just as the employer's interest in the protection of his capital is
entitled to consideration in our interpretation of the Act, so too is
the employee's interest in the protection of his livelihood."
While the Board was giving the Supreme Court's Fibreboard de-
cision a broad interpretation, the courts of appeal around the country
were not. Board orders expanding the duty to bargain over man-
agement decisions were consistently reversed by the appellate courts,
which gave more consideration than did the Board to the majority's
caveats and Justice Stewart's concurrence. In 1971 the Nixon Board,
apparently acquiescing in these court decisions, held in General Motors
Corp. 12 that there was no duty to bargain over a transaction involving
the sale of an employer's business. This basic issue again reached
the United States Supreme Court in 1981 in First National Mainte-
nance Corp. v. NLRB. 3 This case involved the decision of an em-
ployer to close part of its business. In this case the Supreme Court
developed what appears to be a new balancing test. This test was
articulated by the Court as follows:
... bargaining over management decisions that have a substantial
impact on the continued availability of employment should be re-
quired only if the benefit for labor-management relations and the
collective bargaining process outweighs the burden placed on the
conduct of the business. 4
161 NLRB 561 (1966).
Id. at 566.
12 191 NLRB 951 (1971).
"3 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
14 Id. at 679.
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The "benefit for labor-management relations and the collective
bargaining process" is determined by whether the decision in question
is based upon factors which the union could possibly influence through
bargaining. The "burden" is determined by the hardship that the
delay or publicity of bargaining would place on the employer. Thus,
the First National Maintenance approach attempts to balance the
benefits which bargaining would bring for employees against the
burden it would place upon management.
The Fibreboard and First National decisions outline two basic
approaches to the issue of whether a given decision is a mandatory
subject of bargaining. Fibreboard requires looking to the decision
itself and asking whether it represents a change in the nature and
direction of the business. If it does, the decision would not be a
mandatory subject. First National concentrates on the balance between
the potential benefits of collective bargaining and the burdens that
bargaining would place on the employer. If the balance tilts toward
the benefit of bargaining, the decision would be a mandatory subject. 5
There seems to be a difference among the current Board members
in dealing with economically motivated management decisions as to
whether to apply the Fibreboard or First National rationale. In Otis
Elevator,16 a partial plant closing case handed down only recently,
the majority of the Labor Board panel simply said that the decision
to close was at the core of entrepreneurial control and held it was
not a bargainable decision. A concurring member, while reaching the
same result, used the balancing test of First National Maintenance.
The Otis Elevator decision sets out the full range of inquiry which
must be made to determine whether a given management decision is
a mandatory subject of bargaining. First, the nature of the change
within the business brought about by the decision must be ascertained.
Then, the reasons for that change must be known. Third, it must
be determined whether the factors upon which the decision is based
and the relationship between management and the union together
suggest that the decision could be affected by bargaining. And finally,
the burdens which bargaining would place upon management must
be considered. 7
'1 See Datz, Major Economic Decisions of an Employer - Are They Mandatory
Subjects of Bargaining? (delivered at the 1984 Labor Law Insitute, State Bar of
Georgia).
' NLRB 162 (1984).
17 Id.
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In another recent case, the current Labor Board, as well as the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, held that the removal
of work from a unionized plant to a nonunionized plant operated
by the same employer is not a violation of the Act. In earlier decisions
the Labor Board had held that such a move violated section 8(d) of
the statute, which provides that the duty to bargain is not to be
construed as requiring any party to bargain about or agree to any
midterm modification of the terms and conditions of employment
contained in any collective bargaining agreement. However, the Board
and the court held in Milwaukee Spring8 that a transfer of work
did not change any of the provisions of the current collective bar-
gaining agreement; therefore, it was not an illegal midterm violation
of the contract.
There is no question but that current policy in the United States
comes down heavily on the side of management flexibility in the area
of economic decisionmaking. The question is: should that be changed?
1- 268 NLRB 601 (1984).
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